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ARTICLE
Six attachment discourses: convergence, divergence and 
relay
Robbie Duschinskya, Lianne Bakkuma,b, Julia M. M. Mannesa,c, Guy C. M. Skinnerd, 
Melody Turnera, Alissa Manna, Barry Coughlana, Sophie Reijmane, Sarah Fosterf 
and Helen Beckwitha
aDepartment of Public Health and Primary Care, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK; bDepartment of 
Clinical Child and Family Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; cDepartment 
of Psychology, University of Bath, Bath, UK; dInstitute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 
UK; eCenter for Early Intervention and Family Studies, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark; 
fDepartment of Social Work, Education and Community Wellbeing, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, UK
ABSTRACT
Attachment concepts are used in diverging ways, which has caused 
confusion in communication among researchers, among practi-
tioners, and between researchers and practitioners, and hinders 
their potential for collaboration. In this essay we explore how attach-
ment concepts may vary in meaning across six different domains: 
popular discourses, developmental science, social psychological 
science, psychiatric diagnosis, psychotherapy, and child welfare prac-
tice. We attempt to typify these forms of attachment discourse by 
highlighting points of convergence, divergence, and relay between 
the different domains. Our general conclusions are that diversity in 
the use of attachment concepts across different domains of applica-
tion has been largely unrecognised, and that recognition of these 
differences would reduce confusion, help identify sites where infra-
structure needs to be developed to support coordination, and 
strengthen opportunities for collaboration to mutual benefit. We 
suggest that academic attachment discourse would benefit from 
clarification of core terminology, including: “attachment”, “internal 
working model”, “trauma”, and “dysregulation”.
KEYWORDS 
Attachment; child welfare; 
developmental science; 
psychotherapy; sociology of 
science
Introduction
The occasion for this target article and special issue is the publication of Cornerstones of 
Attachment Research (Duschinsky, 2020) by Oxford University Press. The book is available 
for free download thanks to open access funds from the Wellcome Trust. Cornerstones 
analyses the work of five research groups: Bowlby and his collaborators; Ainsworth and 
her students; Main, Hesse and the Berkeley Social Development project; Sroufe, Egeland 
and the Minnesota Longitudinal Study of Risk and Adaptation; and the work of Shaver and 
Mikulincer and their collaborators. Each chapter draws from a comprehensive study of 
published work by the researchers, how their results and ideas were received by others, as 
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well as access to additional sources, such as unpublished books by Bowlby and Main. 
Alongside composition of Cornerstones, where possible we have brought important 
unpublished sources into print (e.g. Duschinsky & White, 2020).
Reflecting on developmental science, Ainsworth (1972, p. 126) observed that “in terms 
of his problem, theoretical orientation, resources, opportunities, and personal style, each 
investigator chooses his own set of compromises. The interests of science seem likely to 
be best served in this context by a multiplicity of studies, each with its own compromises”. 
In line with this, the focus in Cornerstones on five research groups was intended to provide 
a basis to compare and understand the particular challenges and contributions of some 
key researchers, as a lens on the wider predicament of attachment science. Yet 
Cornerstones was by no means an attempt to comprehensively characterise this area of 
research as a whole. It is one contribution to a wider historical literature (e.g. Van der 
Horst, 2011; Van Dijken, 1998), and there is much that it was not able to cover. Additional 
work is on its way, including Mentalisation and Epistemic Trust (Duschinsky & Foster, 2020), 
a book addressing the research and ideas of Fonagy and colleagues at the Anna Freud 
Centre, which will also be free to download.
In this essay we use historical and sociological analysis to draw out one of the themes 
of Cornerstones: the diverging ways in which attachment concepts are used across 
scientific, applied, and popular domains, often without recognition of this divergence. 
There is no problem in divergence, and to an extent it is inevitable. The problem, we 
propose, is that the divergence is not recognised and dealt with, which may lead to 
confusion in communication among researchers, practitioners, and the general public. 
Bosmans (2016) has observed that there is comparatively good coherence in the use of 
concepts between researchers and clinicians in the tradition of cognitive behavioural 
therapy, and infrastructure to support this coordination. This is in contrast to attachment 
concepts, which, as we illustrate over the course of the next sections, are more likely to be 
overfull of contradictory meanings, allowing individuals and groups to talk past one 
another and hindering their potential for collaboration.
To respond to this problem, our intended contribution here has been the attempt to 
typify these divergent forms of attachment discourse. In doing so we have sought to 
acknowledge that each is shaped by distinct social contexts, the priorities of these 
contexts, and their criteria for what counts as relevant and dependable knowledge and 
measurement, as well as criteria for who is considered a credible speaker. In terms of the 
problem we are seeking to address, an analogy from statistics would be the issue of 
measurement invariance, which asks whether a construct is measuring the same thing 
across different groups. Whereas Cornerstones, as a book, has space to be detail-focused, 
this essay is necessarily more schematic; readers may consult Cornerstones for the full 
arguments and referencing supporting the claims made here. Our ambition here is to 
capitalise on the advantages of schematism, sketching some critical lines of difference in 
the use of attachment concepts by considering four questions:
(1) What is the context of the account of attachment?
(2) What do accounts of attachment demand from their concepts, given their 
contexts?
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(3) How do accounts of attachment handle the mismatch between the contextual 
demands on them, and the properties of actually available attachment theory and 
research?
(4) What are the points of relay – of dependence and articulation – between different 
accounts of attachment?
Our inquiry here runs against the assumption, appearing among proponents but espe-
cially among critics of attachment theory, that the strengths and weaknesses of the 
paradigm are the same across its different contexts of application. We apply the four 
questions above to consider points of convergence, divergence and relay between six 
domains: popular discourses, developmental science, social psychological science, psy-
chiatric diagnosis, psychotherapy, and child welfare practice. We do not intend to suggest 
that individuals and groups are forced in any simple way to follow dominant discourses, 
or lack awareness of historical and sociological processes. In fact attachment researchers 
have sustained reflexive commentary over decades on the state and challenges of 
attachment research, and drawn on these reflections to inform their studies (classic 
works include Van IJzendoorn & Tavecchio, 1987; Waters & Sroufe, 1983).
Furthermore, our intention is to highlight, and by no means to negate, the fact that 
there are important links between the different domains. There are many nodal indivi-
duals and groups between these networks of discourse and practice: for instance Charles 
Zeanah and colleagues bridge developmental and psychiatric discourses; and Peter 
Fonagy and Arietta Slade and their colleagues bridge developmental and psychother-
apeutic discourses. There are also structural nodes between discourses, such as the 
“implications” sections of papers, in which academic attachment discourse can transition 
into one of the other forms. We hope that our typifications of a heterogeneous and 
contested reality may offer constructive insight into certain tendencies in the contem-
porary situation of attachment theory and research, whilst also providing a frame for 




During the 1950s, Bowlby addressed various audiences: academic, clinical and wider 
publics. Bowlby’s popular writings in this period represented less developed and qualified 
ideas than in his later scholarly work; these ideas were also further simplified and yoked to 
existing popular assumptions and metaphors to increase their accessibility. This helped the 
ideas travel into public discourse, which would not have been as easy if accompanied by 
technical depth and qualifications. Today, there are a variety of ways in which attachment 
is discussed in the media. Some are accurate whilst retaining accessibility; a prime example 
are those by Sheri Madigan (https://www.madiganlab.com/additional-resources). However, 
the legacy of Bowlby’s early popular writing, together with the inaccessibility of academic 
attachment discourse (e.g. behind paywalls; little public engagement from 1970–2000s) 
have helped give rise to a potent and pervasive popular attachment discourse. Popular 
attachment discourse is nested in and circulates through mass market books, magazines, 
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internet forums, new social media, policy reports, and other public forms in which a “quick 
hit” is expected, and depth penalised. The family and parenting are perennial objects of 
public concern; in part this is because the family is the site of reproduction of the public. 
Popular discourses claim the authority of “public outrage” to make judgements about 
normal and abnormal forms of parenting. Attachment is invoked to speak to societal 
concerns about parenting and the family, and intersects with gendered assumptions 
about these institutions, often in mutually reinforcing and moralised ways.
Desires
Popular attachment discourse must walk a tightrope: it needs to retain resonance with 
ordinary language and its assumptions in order to be appealing, presenting a quality of 
obviousness and intuitiveness, whilst also appearing to offer something extra in terms of 
authority, depth or insight. It must be “light enough to travel”: able to plug into various 
ordinary situations and feel relevant. Over the past decade, the scientific appearance of 
popular attachment discourse has been reinforced through appeal to neuroscience, 
which makes claims appear more real and founded.
Adjustments
To make attachment theory and research meet the demands of the popular context, popular 
attachment discourse has some distinct qualities. At a theoretical level, Bowlby’s behavioural 
systems model of the mind is cut. Citations are generally to the early Bowlby, or to neuros-
cientific glosses on Bowlby’s emphasis on the importance of early care. Meta-analytic research 
is ignored wholesale in popular attachment discourse, since this would require much more 
moderate and tempered claims. Attachment is often treated as a synonym of close relation-
ships and used not only to describe a child’s bond to a key caregiver, but also a parent’s 
“attachment” to their child. Individual differences in attachment have generally been for-
matted to focus on the divisions between “good” and “bad”, and “strong” and “weak” 
attachments. Though popular attachment discourses with stronger links to developmental 
or social psychological attachment discourses tend to divide between “secure” and “insecure”. 
Nonetheless, where security and insecurity are invoked, popular attachment discourse has an 
affinity for treating the Ainsworth categories as natural kinds, and disorganised attachment as 
chaotic, a state of “madness”. In part, this is because “how the sausages are made” in coding 
the Strange Situation and other aspects of methodology are passed over, as well as the 
relative applicability of Ainsworth’s classifications after infancy; this makes the categories 
seem more like natural kinds. In part, the Ainsworth classifications are interpreted through 
a folk psychology that assumes category membership is: fixed; non-overlapping; lacking in 
internal heterogeneity; rooted in hidden causal processes which achieve particular functions; 
and that deviation from categories mean a thing is broken (Atran, 1998).
Relay
Popular attachment discourse has drawn from the academic authority of developmental 
attachment research, as well as the concept of “attachment disorders” from psychiatric 
discourse. Attempts to qualify and circumscribe the object of these discourses have not 
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entirely hindered this authority, since technical debates struggle to circulate beyond their 
immediate sphere. Popular attachment discourse has also been fed by the role of appeals 
to attachment within child welfare, which make attachment seem relevant to ultimate 
judgements about acceptable and unacceptable parenting, and the responsibility of the 
public to address this (e.g. Building Greater Britons, 2015). Social psychology has also 
entered popular discourse concerned with the formation and maintenance of well- 
functioning couples, thanks especially to the idea, implied by Hazan and Shaver’s early 
“love quiz” measure, that “attachment styles” are transparently available to individuals 
themselves. The contemporary idea in social psychology of attachment anxiety and 
avoidance as latent factors, with meaning beyond an individual’s self-knowledge, has not 
had the same appeal for popular attachment discourse. The Adult Attachment Interview 
(AAI) has likewise has not been picked up by much popular attachment discourse.
Attachment research in developmental science
Context
Attachment emerged as a thriving paradigm within developmental psychology in the 
1970s, led initially by Mary Ainsworth’s research group, but with important groups 
subsequently emerging in Berkeley, Minnesota, Regensburg and SUNY in the 1980s, 
and Pennsylvania, Harvard, Leiden, Maryland, Haifa and London by the early 1990s. This 
domain of attachment discourse has been firmly nested within the wider terrain of 
academic developmental science, and forms a standard part of the curriculum taught to 
students. The filiation of developmental attachment research from Ainsworth has func-
tioned as a form of symbolic authority, one that social psychologists have publicly 
criticised in the 2000s as an obstacle to the acceptance of work by social psychologists 
(e.g. Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002; see also Spies & Duschinsky, 2021). The laboratory setting 
favoured by developmental science has allowed the control of variables and close 
observation of subtle behaviours, helping sustain the authority of this discourse as 
a form of scientific knowledge. Where this might be put at risk, researchers have tended 
not to go, for instance, study of reunions in daycare settings or following therapy would 
have been a much more scalable assessment than the Strange Situation, and contributed 
to lower costs, larger sample-sizes, and better links to professional practice. Yet few 
attachment researchers have examined reunions with parents in daycare settings or 
following therapy (exceptions include Bick et al., 2012; Steele et al., 2019). 
Developmental science has been especially focused on the developmental foundations 
of social competence and mental health, perhaps due to the legacy of Bowlby’s theory or 
their clinical relevance, but perhaps also as a result of their relevance to potential funders. 
In sociological perspective, social competence and mental health can be seen to corre-
spond to an individual’s external and internal functionality.
Desires
Developmental attachment discourse can be typified as oriented by four interrelated 
desires. First, the paradigm has sought evidence of external validity, through attempts to 
demonstrate a nomological network of predictable correlates, especially in the domains 
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of mental health and social competence. Second, developmentalists have sought con-
vergent validity as functional legitimacy for their constructs. This has had special priority, 
given small samples and high barriers to effective use of complex observational measures 
such as the Strange Situation and AAI. Third, developmental attachment discourse has 
explored a vast array of correlates, to varying degrees driven by theory (Waters et al., 
2005). Yet, within this diversity, a particular focus has been attempts to understand 
developmental processes relevant to the basis of individual self-regulation or dysregula-
tion. Fourth, developmental attachment research has been oriented by the desire to have 
work accepted by the wider field of developmental psychology (e.g. journals, grants), 
providing the economic and symbolic capital necessary for the reproduction of the 
paradigm within academic life.
Adjustments
Developmental attachment discourse has made several adjustments to meet these 
desires. Forms of attachment have been formatted to focus on the divisions secure/ 
insecure and organised/disorganised. Subtypes appear to have no currency for the 
project of sustaining and furthering attachment research within generalizable science 
with adequate statistical power. For instance, though van IJzendoorn and colleagues 
(1983) speculated on the meaning of the B4 subclassification, this has not been tested 
when data later became available to do so. The ambivalent/resistant attachment has, for 
the same reason, been frequently amalgamated in analyses into an overarching “insecure” 
category, though there are exceptions. Another adjustment has been a doubling down on 
the Strange Situation and AAI to sustain convergent validity, and a focus on individual 
differences more than normative processes. In this focus on individual differences, further 
elaboration of the idea of behavioural systems has been neglected (e.g. the questions of 
whether anger is a behavioural system; whether a dominance system could shed light on 
controlling-punitive behaviour), in favour of a theoretical focus on “minimising” and 
“maximising” of attachment. And in the conceptualisation of “minimising” and “maximis-
ing”, as documented in Duschinsky (2020), the dominant frame of reference has been 
Cassidy’s (1994) interpretation of these in terms of regulation, social competence and 
mental health, and not Main’s (1995) model of attentional processes.
Besides these, we would emphasise two adjustments of particular importance for 
developmental attachment discourse. A first was the early adoption of meta-analysis, as 
a tool for attesting to credible, convergent knowledge and for understanding moderators 
of disappointment, for instance the “transmission gap” between the AAI and Strange 
Situation indexing the structural need to gain capital in developmental science by 
reporting large effect sizes (see e.g. the discussion in Verhage et al., 2016). A second 
adjustment was an implicit acceptance by the generation of developmental scientists 
after Ainsworth, that research using measures like the Strange Situation and the AAI could 
only be a small and technical area of academic work (see e.g. Waters, 1983, advocating 
that only trained coders should use the Strange Situation, and announcing the com-
mencement of accredited training). The Strange Situation and AAI are penetrating, 
resource-intensive, and must generally be understood in depth by a researcher in order 
for their work with the measure to contribute meaningfully to theory in the develop-
mental tradition. This combination has led to the construction of an oral culture of 
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training institutes, unpublished coding manuals, and mentorship by established devel-
opmental attachment researchers for transmission of the tradition. This solution was not 
inevitable – priority could have been given to testing abbreviated versions of measures 
(e.g. Caron et al., 2018, using a cut-down AAI) decades earlier. Dependence on an oral 
culture risks certain in-group dynamics and assumes the inevitability of a small possible 
number of credible developmental attachment researchers. Given the intensified impera-
tive for psychometric credibility, generalisability and scalability in contemporary devel-
opmental science, this solution has begun to see significant renegotiation (see Schuengel 
et al., this issue). In sociological perspective, perhaps the most important question is 
whether developmental attachment research is still professionally rewarding enough to 
recruit able early career researchers. So far, in our view, that has remained the case, 
though the unusual time-investment required for credibility as a developmental attach-
ment researcher constricts recruitment, for instance, by making it difficult for able 
researchers in cognate areas to put a toe in the water.
Relay
Our studies have suggested that developmental attachment research has been rather 
sealed off from popular and psychiatric attachment discourses, oriented much more by 
the internal demands of academic life. There has, however, been significant relay from 
therapeutic discourses. For instance, the concept of “mentalisation” has served as 
a “boundary object”, incorporating sufficiently diverse meanings as to suture – and at 
times mask – gaps between the concerns of therapists and researchers (as acknowledged 
by Fonagy & Allison, 2012). Likewise, theorising about disorganised attachment by 
researchers has been influenced by the connotations in therapeutic discourse of the 
idea of “disorganisation” (Reijman et al., 2018). An important development in the past 
decade for developmental attachment research has been the increasing relay from social 
psychology, where standards for psychometric credibility, generalisability and scalability 
rose faster in the 1990s and 2000s than developmental science. The strategies developed 
by social psychologists – such as replacement of attachment categories with dimensions 
constructed using taxometric methods and validation of short versions of existing mea-
sures – have gained increasing hearing among developmentalists. Chris Fraley and Glenn 
Roisman have been nodal figures in this shift.
Attachment research in social psychology
Context
Social psychology attachment discourse is nested within the wider terrain of social 
psychology, and cognate areas of personality and experimental psychology. In the early 
1980s, Shaver and colleagues used self-report methodology to explore individual differ-
ences in attachment. Initially, the Ainsworth Strange Situation categories were extrapo-
lated into “attachment styles”, readily knowable and reportable by the individual 
themselves. However, Brennan et al. (1998) identified attachment anxiety and avoidance 
as two latent factors in individual differences in attachment, using these latent factors to 
create the Experiences in Close Relationships scale (ECR). Attachment anxiety and 
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avoidance are now seen as latent processes that can shape perceptions, attitudes, and 
preferences, without the individual’s awareness. This has been especially reflected in 
research examining the effect of attachment primes on behaviour. Where such findings 
prove replicable, they offer particular credibility in promising to isolate causal processes.
Desires
Social psychological attachment discourse can be typified as oriented by four interrelated 
desires. First, the paradigm has sought evidence of external validity of the treatment of 
adult relationships as attachment relationships, through attempts to demonstrate 
a nomological network of predictable correlates, especially in the study of strategies for 
responding to potential stress in romantic relationships. Through these efforts, they have 
achieved recognition as a legitimate branch of attachment research, despite lacking the 
filiation from Ainsworth available to the developmentalists. Second, given low barriers to 
the creation of ever-more self-report measures, there has been a structural need for 
methodological convergence, epitomised by the creation of the ECR in the 1990s. Third, 
attachment research in social psychology has generally sought to shed light on individual 
social preferences and attitudes towards togetherness in relationships. This can be 
regarded as a specific form of the wider liberal frame of reference in social psychology, 
which registers humans at the point that they can act independently, though the concern 
is then with how they ultimately live together (Stainton Rogers et al., 1995). Fourth, 
acceptance has been sought from the wider field of social psychology (e.g. journals, 
grants), providing the economic and symbolic capital necessary for the reproduction of 
the paradigm within academic life.
Adjustments
Social psychological attachment researchers have negotiated the tradition of Bowlby and 
Ainsworth in new ways, shaped by their concerns. For instance, the idea of completely 
independent and distinct internal working models of “self” and of “others” was excavated 
by social psychologists from Bowlby (1973) even though the claim that models of “self” 
and “other” are independent only appears once in his writings. Elsewhere Bowlby used 
the term to indicate that we develop expectations about self-interacting-with-others, not 
independent and distinct individual attitudes towards “self” and “others”. To take another 
example: whereas developmentalists have left Bowlby’s notion of behavioural systems 
gathering dust on the shelf, Shaver, Mikulincer, and colleagues have given this idea 
extensive consideration, and developed scales for “anxious” and “avoidant” forms of 
other behavioural systems, mixing their labour with Bowlby’s legacy on topics outside 
those symbolically owned by the developmentalists. Social psychologists have also by 
and large limited their interest to adequately functioning individuals who are capable of 
exercising autonomy. Less concern has been given to samples where both high anxiety 
and high avoidance might be expected, producing conflict within attitudes and prefer-
ences. Little attention has also been paid to parenting: at best, self-report measures would 
draw with the AAI in predicting parenting, and there was the possibility that they would 
lose. This would risk hindering the standing of the social psychological tradition with 
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developmentalists, for whom, since Ainsworth, the study of attachment overlaps exten-
sively with the study of parenting.
Another adjustment has been the use of factor analysis to establish theory and 
methodological convergence. On the one hand, this approach has helped achieve cred-
ibility in the field of social psychology generally, and helped to sustain consensus. 
However it arguably shut the box too quickly and tightly on theoretical questions about 
the meaning of the “minimising” and “maximising” of attachment. For instance, items 
were smuggled aboard the ECR assessing passivity and aggression, which cloud associa-
tions between the ECR and passive or aggressive behaviour. More importantly, the 
presumption of two latent factors has led to widespread disinterest in growing evidence 
suggesting that security is its own factor, not reducible to the absence of anxiety or 
avoidance (a notable exception is Gillath et al., 2009). To give another example: whilst 
Shaver and Mikulincer’s thinking about a dominance behavioural system is potentially 
a fruitful development for attachment research, their account has been undermined by 
problems in conceptualising what the minimisation of dominance might mean.
Relay
Attachment research by social psychologists has drawn extensively on the terminology of 
the developmental tradition. However, as we document in Cornerstones and elsewhere, 
almost every such term is used with a different sense between the two traditions, 
contributing to extensive miscommunication. For instance by “internal working models”, 
social psychologists mean the elaborated symbolic and affective representations made by 
humans about attachment figures and their availability, and the value of the self to these 
attachment figures. Developmental scientists generally mean expectations about the 
availability of attachment figures. An exception are those developmentalists interfacing 
strongly with psychotherapy, who tend towards appeal to the ordinary language con-
notations of terms, which sometimes and incidentally tends to align them with social 
psychological uses of these terms.
Attachment in guidance for psychotherapy
Context
Bowlby ([1985] 2020) recalled his development of attachment theory as an attempt to 
provide a model for psychotherapy, more than the basis for a paradigm for empirical 
research. In the mid-1990s, many texts were produced with an audience of psychothera-
pists and other psy-practitioners in mind, which drew in varying ways, and to varying 
degrees, on the authority and insights of the theory offered by the developmental tradi-
tion. Jeremy Holmes, Allan Schore, Patricia Crittenden, Daniel Hughes, Sue Johnson, and 
Peter Fonagy may be listed as among the many prominent advocates of attachment to 
psychotherapists. From the 2000s, this theory-based guidance has been elaborated, qua-
lified, and contested by guidance based on empirical research with patients (Berry & 
Danquah, 2016; Steele & Steele, 2018). This domain of attachment discourse has been 
supported by the availability of attachment concepts for supporting clinical formulation by 
presenting claims that are encompassing, intuitive, and potentially insightful, and by the 
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passion of contemporary clinical organisations (e.g. responding to the bureaucratic logic of 
the National Health Service; the demands of health insurers in the US) for categories as the 
basis of action and allocating resources. The interest of clinicians and clinical organisations 
has helped sustain a market for commercial trainings and associated books.
Desires
Attachment discourse in works for psychotherapists can be typified as oriented by four 
interrelated desires. First this discourse requires an evocative vocabulary about human 
relating, permitting wide perceptions of relevance by practitioners supporting clients with 
different problems; it must walk a similar “tightrope” to popular attachment discourse. 
Second, it must offer to make sense of psychological distress in its complexity, especially 
with respect to transdiagnostic factors, as well as suggest next steps. Third, it must appear 
to have the imprimatur of science, permitting “evidence-based practice”. Finally, there is 
a general desire for scales with cut-offs or categories for assessment of attachment, giving 
information for formulation and judging thresholds for interventions.
Adjustments
Perhaps the most important adaptation of attachment in guidance for psychotherapists, 
compared to academic uses of the same concepts, has been that insecurity is framed as the 
mechanism of all mental pathology rather than a correlate. For instance, Fonagy and 
colleagues (e.g. Fonagy & Allison, 2012) have situated non-mentalising as the basis for 
most mental health disorders, and as occurring when the attachment system is activated 
without access to the capacity to reflect on thoughts and feelings. Crittenden interprets 
individual differences in attachment as the basis of information-processing strategies 
responsive to an individual’s history and current environment, again treated as implicated 
in most forms of mental ill health (see e.g. Crittenden, 2017, on autism).
Relays
Guidance for therapeutic practice based on attachment theory has drawn primarily, if not 
exclusively, from the terminology – though not the operationalization – offered by 
developmental attachment research. Popular attachment theory and child welfare attach-
ment discourse have also helped support a “surround sound” effect of mutually suppor-
tive discourses giving the impression that a thing called “attachment” is important for 
children’s wellbeing, though at the price of absorbing some moralisation about family life 
(e.g. parental gender norms), and at the price of significant mystification of what is 
actually meant by attachment.
Attachment in psychiatric diagnosis
Context
Our empirical work has identified that attachment discourses have had various forms of 
influence on psychiatric diagnostic practices. For instance, as Coughlan has documented, 
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they may appear in differential diagnosis of children showing socioemotional and com-
munication difficulties, where alternatives might be ADHD and autism spectrum disorder 
(Coughlan et al., 2021). Our focus here will be on the entry of attachment to psychiatric 
diagnosis as the attachment disorder diagnosis, since this is the primary formal location of 
appeal to attachment. We have papers forthcoming on other uses of attachment within 
diagnostic practice.
In 1980, the “Infancy, Childhood and Adolescent Disorders” committee of the 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980) 
introduced the category of “reactive attachment disorder in infancy” as a recognised 
diagnosis. This was an attempt to bring within medical assessment practice observa-
tions that had been made of behaviours shown by institutionalised and former institu-
tionalised children, drawing on Bowlby’s influential 1951 report to the World Health 
Organization, as well as other reports. Bowlby’s work after 1958 – i.e. his theory of 
attachment – was not incorporated into the conceptualisation. Initially, the disorder was 
to be diagnosed on the basis of weak infant physical growth, poor social responsive-
ness, and emotional apathy, as a consequence of grossly inadequate experiences of 
caregiving. In 1987, the diagnosis was revised to remove the physical growth criterion 
and adjust the age criterion, and has since seen other changes. Since the 1990s, there 
has been slowly growing research concern with attachment disorders. A lack of infra-
structure to develop, specify and regulate use of the category has contributed to 
concerns about both over- and under-diagnosis of “attachment disorders”, as well as 
leaving space for quackery in the marketing of promised commercial cures (Allen & 
Schuengel, 2020). Taken together, attachment disorder as a psychiatric classification can 
be attributed to the intersection of two contexts. The first is the role of psychiatric 
nosology in the structuring of mental health services and billing. A second is institu-
tional care and unstable foster care, which can allow children to grow up without 
a stable attachment figure.
Desires
Psychiatric discourse on attachment disorder, firstly, seems concerned to shed light on the 
way that some children, following chronic experiences of insufficient and/or highly 
unstable care, may fail to seek and respond to comfort from others, leading to disruptions 
in mental health and social competence. The category is a hinge between an ostensive 
cause (a history of insufficient care) and a set of behaviours (failure to seek and respond to 
comfort). The presumption is that the diagnosis allows the behaviours to be interpreted, 
making sense of clinical complexity. Though there is as yet little scientific evidence for 
treatment for attachment disorders. Researchers working with the attachment disorder 
category have sought to establish a scientific basis for it sufficient for its retention as 
a psychiatric diagnosis.
Adjustment
Comparing psychiatric attachment discourse to the other five forms of attachment dis-
course considered here, the lack of lexical crossover is striking: they seem to only have the 
word “attachment” in common. Viewed as a network, psychiatric attachment discourse is 
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quite isolated from the others. Though there has been some work attempting to consider 
how the category relates to the tradition of developmental attachment research. This has 
been hindered by a lack of conceptual clarity about the meaning of “insufficient care”, and 
by inconsistency in assessment practices. In recent years, behaviours suggesting indis-
criminate behaviour towards adults have been conceptualised as less integral to the 
attachment disorder construct than failure to seek care, which promises to tighten the 
relationship between theory and diagnosis (Zimmermann & Soares, 2019).
Relays
Psychiatric attachment discourse drew from Bowlby’s early work on institutionalisation, 
but then for decades ran independently of the developmental tradition of attachment 
research. This helped leave space for an intersection of popular attachment discourses 
with the underdeveloped psychiatric category, contributing to the emergence of spurious 
“attachment therapies” (e.g. holding therapy). In past decades some attempts have been 
made at rapprochement between psychiatric and developmental attachment discourses, 
especially as developmental researchers have acknowledged the need of adoptive and 
foster parents, and the clinicians working with them, to understand their children’s 
behaviour.
Attachment as child welfare
Context
In the 1950s and 1960s, Bowlby was active in advocating the relevance of his ideas for 
child welfare practice. Attachment theory offers welfare professionals a framework that 
appears to predict later risk to a child’s health and development from the child or parents’ 
observable behaviour. Over the years, both social work academics and policy documents 
have encouraged welfare professionals to use the image of secure attachment as the 
point of comparison when making assessments of parenting capacity. Today, attachment 
as child welfare discourses are nested within the institutional framework of the children’s 
workforce, safeguarding practice, and the family courts. In a survey conducted by the UK 
Department for Education (2018) of organisations working with children in need of help 
and protection, attachment theory was, by a large margin, cited as the most frequently 
used underpinning perspective.
Desires
This domain of attachment discourse appeals to attachment concepts to signify childrens’ 
welfare and best interests, delivering categorical judgements about the basis for action in 
predicting and preventing future harm (Forslund et al., 2021). In this way, attachment is 
sought as a way to make sense of complexity and minimise uncertainty, which together 
promise to specify risk and therefore indicate next steps. This usage stands in conflict with 
the anti-labelling values of some of the children’s workforce; this reflects a broader 
conflict for helping professionals within contemporary risk-focused institutions.
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Adjustments
Attachment as child welfare discourse tends to deploy attachment categories as if they 
were quasi-diagnostic. Whereas clinical diagnosis is a form of judgment restricted to 
clinical professionals, attachment categories are not regulated. There have been social 
work academics who have advocated for – and offered commercial trainings in – the use 
of the categories in child welfare practice, without the need for specialist training. 
Individual differences in attachment have generally been formatted to focus on the 
divisions between “good” and “bad”, and “strong” and “weak” attachments, though at 
times “insecure attachment”, “attachment disorder”, “attachment issues”, or “attachment 
problems” are invoked to signify a prognosis requiring state intervention. Nonetheless, 
these appeals to attachment may not be regarded as credible by the family courts (see 
e.g. G.M. v. Carmarthenshire County Council & Anor, 2018), and many practitioners are 
unsure how best to draw attachment theory into child welfare practice. This predicament 
can contribute to extremes of overzealous use and aversion to ideas of attachment, 
alongside some hesitant use (e.g. North, 2019). As with popular attachment discourse, 
parents may be described as “attached” to their child.
Some of this uncertainty may manifest from a lack of available, or indeed sufficiently 
specific and sensitive, measures for assessment of individual cases according to psycho-
metric criteria. There is also uncertainty about how practitioners are meant to use 
attachment concepts without specialist training in placing children into attachment 
categories. Some practitioners therefore seek further training in assigning attachment 
categories (e.g. Dallos et al., 2020), while other researchers advocate for a move from static 
diagnoses to assessments of the potential for enhanced parenting (Van IJzendoorn et al., 
2018). Though there is yet to be any evaluation of whether child welfare assessment 
informed by attachment is superior to assessment as usual, in part due to the weak 
networks linking child welfare practice and academic attachment research.
Relays
A marked quality of attachment as child welfare discourse is that, especially in its less 
sophisticated forms, concepts are drawn without particular distinction from popular, 
developmental, therapeutic and psychiatric discourses. However it may be noted that 
access to developmental attachment research or psychiatric research is very rarely direct, 
and generally mediated by texts written by popularisers who are not themselves trained 
in the relevant measures. This has at times led to inadvertent but profound mischaracter-
isation of the available research in works for welfare practitioners (e.g. Pearce, 2009).
Conclusion
Bowlby wrote and spoke for a variety of different audiences, writing numerous magazine 
articles, academic works, and works for applied practitioners in psychiatry, psychotherapy 
and child welfare. However, Ainsworth and the generation following her withdrew from 
exogenous engagement, except to an extent with psychotherapists, contributing to the 
fragmentation of the meanings of attachment discourse across groups ostensibly using 
the same ideas. This was despite a proliferation of program and policy applications of 
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attachment ideas during the period. Such disengagement has been shifting in recent 
years, as researchers have sought to be more responsive to the concerns of popular and 
applied attachment discourses. The shift coincides, in a macro perspective, with growing 
concerns with the democratic standing of academic research since the 1990s, and more 
locally with changes in the concerns of attachment research away from distinctions 
between attachment classifications, and towards intervention research (Schuengel et al., 
this issue). We anticipate that any “move to the level of collaboration” will be helped first 
by wider recognition of the various discourses as we have presented here, and second, by 
some conceptual spring cleaning. As a start, we propose a clarification of academic 
attachment discourse particularly in the following six areas:
(1) Where any fine work needs doing, academic discourse would benefit from avoiding 
shorthands where it is assumed that others will pick up the intended meaning. For 
instance rather than the overladen term “attachment” it may be preferable to 
specify e.g. “perceived safe haven availability”. Waters and Waters (e.g. 2006; 
Waters et al., 2020) have been arguing along related lines for some years, and 
Thompson et al. (2020) have recently made similar claims.
(2) The model of “minimising” and “maximising” of attachment needs further scrutiny. 
Main’s attentional theory should be translated into testable hypotheses, including 
whether security has attentional properties irreducible to the absence of “minimis-
ing” or “maximising” forms of insecurity.
(3) The term “expectations” could be used instead of “internal working model” when 
this is what is meant. Where something else is meant, this should be spelt out.
(4) The phrase “states of mind regarding attachment” is currently a cypher, and often 
no more revealing than “internal working models”. For instance it remains 
unknown whether unresolved states of mind is a construct that offers any incre-
mental validity over conventional measures of dissociation and posttraumatic 
stress.
(5) Relatedly, there especially appear to be breakdowns of communication when the 
concept of “trauma” is invoked in attachment discourses. There are usually some 
among the varied meanings of the term that both resonate and feel urgent for each 
person. This allows for good-natured and mutually convenient misunderstandings – 
especially between developmental researchers and psychotherapists.
(6) Researchers may wish to clarify the kind of “dysregulation” under discussion, rather 
than leaning on the connotations of the term. For instance, emotional flooding and 
constricted depression could both be considered dysregulated, but may well have 
different causes and implications (cf. Siegel, 1999, on the “Window of Tolerance”).
More generally, our conclusion here is that both advocates and critics of attachment 
theory have paid too little attention to differences in the ways that the theory has been 
adapted to the challenges and opportunities of its different domains of application. 
Tables 1–5 in the supplemental material seek to illustrate this point by displaying how 
the terms “attachment”, “security”, “internal working model”, “attachment-related 
trauma”, and “disorganisation” – though appearing to refer to a common object – in 
fact are given different meanings. We have discussed other cases elsewhere (e.g. 
Duschinsky & Foster, 2020, on “adaptation”). Different meanings referred to with 
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a common term are liable to cause confusion, especially to those who are exposed to, 
users of, or contributors to more than one of the above discourses. For example in the 
case of “internal working model”, by which Bowlby meant expectations about the avail-
ability of the attachment figure, social psychologists mean elaborated and cognitive 
representations of the attachment figures and the self, and which Main et al. (1985) 
initially characterised as the construct measured by the AAI. This has led to a lack of 
specification as to what the AAI measures (it is not, as the name suggests, “adult attach-
ment”). It has also contributed to communication barriers between developmental and 
social psychologists, for example in formulating hypotheses about when the AAI and ECR 
are expected to converge and diverge. In addition to causing confusion, unacknowledged 
differences in meaning also hinder the opportunity to make use of the knowledge and 
strengths of each domain, and direct attention away from the need to foster infrastructure 
to support coordination and mutual intelligibility across different domains. For example, 
such infrastructure might include forums to facilitate co-development of research agen-
das. The development of this infrastructure will be hindered if, for example, child “secur-
ity” is assumed to be a goal, but actors take this to mean different things (see Table 2 for 
the varying meanings of attachment security across domains). For instance accurate and 
appropriate use of attachment theory, research and instruments – including concepts 
such as security – in the family courts has been obstructed by the difficulties in sustaining 
mutually enriching dialogue between researchers and court practitioners. The latter have 
had little ability to influence the direction of research, and there have been few profes-
sional rewards for researchers to address applied questions or refine and validate instru-
ments for application in the court context (Garber, 2009).
In general, we advocate greater mutual intelligibility between domains, and hold that 
this may be facilitated by awareness of the technical use of terminology by academic 
Table 1. Typification of differences in conceptualisations of “attachment”.
“Attachment”
Popular Discourses The child’s love for a parent, predominantly the mother; it is often utilised to signal moral 
expectations on the parent.
Developmental 
Science
The use of a caregiving figure as a safe haven (as well as potentially a secure base) signalling 
the history of the caregiving relationship.
Social Psychological 
Science
Close relationships with emotion regulatory functions, signalling the extent of anxiety or 
avoidance an individual experiences in these relationships.
Psychotherapy Close relationships with emotion regulatory functions, signalling the extent of individuals’ 
difficulties with relational and self-understanding.
Psychiatric Diagnosis The disposition to discriminate and seek a familiar caregiver when alarmed, signalling the 
existence of an attachment relationship as the basis for mental health.
Child Welfare Practice The relationship quality between the child and their caregiver, signalling the child’s best 
interest.
Table 2. Typification of differences in conceptualisations of “security”.
“Security”
Popular Discourses A good and confident psychological state, and is presented as a desired state for everyone.
Developmental Science The perceived availability of a safe haven in one’s attachment figure(s) (“felt security”).
Social Psychological 
Science
The absence of attachment anxiety and avoidance.
Psychotherapy The mechanism of good mental health in the therapeutic relationship, and in a client’s other 
interactions.
Child Welfare Practice A good parent-child relationship, indexing a child’s best interest.
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researchers. At the same time we would urge that differences in perspectives and skills 
between domains are recognised and used. This would not only be the “transmission” of 
knowledge from high status knowledge to low status discourses. For instance: 




Used variously to mean:
● Expectations about the availability of attachment figures built up on the basis of repeated 
sequences of procedural interaction.
● Elaborated symbolic meanings and images built up by humans about attachment figures 
and their availability.




The elaborated symbolic and affective representations made by humans about attachment 
figures and their availability, and the value of the self to these attachment figures.
Psychotherapy Elaborated conscious and unconscious symbolic meanings and images held by humans about 
attachment figures and their availability, and considered to be malleable through therapy.
Table 4. Typification of differences in conceptualisations of “attachment-related trauma”.
“Attachment-Related Trauma”
Popular Discourses Separations and other disruptions of the “natural” family.
Developmental 
Science
Negative impact of adverse events like loss and abuse on an individual’s current psychological 
state, evidenced by disoriented, incoherent discussion of these events
Social Psychological 
Science
An adverse event presumed to be a predisposing factor or cause of attachment anxiety and 
avoidance and/or an adverse event made psychologically disruptive by preexisting 
attachment insecurity.
Psychotherapy Any experience from family life that is chronically disruptive of an individual’s internal and 
external regulatory capabilities. Includes abuse and neglect from caregivers or other trusted 
adults. Sometimes also referred to as “developmental trauma”.
Psychiatric Diagnosis DSM/ICD definition of posttraumatic stress disorder.
Child Welfare Practice Experiences that compromise the health and development of a child, and occurring in the 
context of the parent-child relationship.




Used variously to mean:
● Conflict, confusion and/or apprehension shown by an infant towards their caregiver in the 
Strange Situation.
● A significant disruption of a behavioural system. It is this (invisible) disruption at the level 
of motivation, which is presumed to cause the visible conflicted, confused or apprehensive 
behaviour seen, for instance, in the Strange Situation.
● A category label for infant-caregiver dyads seen in the Strange Situation, where conflicted, 
confused and/or apprehensive behaviour is seen to a significant degree.
● The category label for controlling-punitive and controlling-caregiving behaviour in the 
Main and Cassidy 6-year reunion system. The behaviour was generally smoothly 
sequenced, goal-oriented, and often resulted in some form of caregiver availability – so it 
was not technically disorganised at a behavioural level. However, Main and Cassidy used 
the term “disorganised” to signal developmental continuities from infancy, and to high-
light that controlling-punitive and controlling-caregiving behaviour likely arises in the 
context of disruption to the child-caregiver relationship and its usual hierarchies.




The co-presence of attachment anxiety and avoidance and/or random chaotic behaviour.
Psychotherapy A mechanism underpinning the contribution of emotion dysregulation to mental ill health.
Child Welfare Practice A bad parent-child relationship, indexing a failure to align with a child’s best interest.
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developmental attachment research could learn from popular attachment discourse, 
since the latter does not limit the concept of security to close relationships, and opens 
the question of what bidirectional links there may be between other sources of security 
(e.g. body confidence) and attachment relationships. This would return the field to 
questions that Ainsworth (2010, p. 49) felt had been neglected: “By focusing so closely 
on intimacies some attachment researchers have come to conceive of them as the only 
source of security – which is a pity”. Or again, attention to attachment in guidance to 
therapists is concerned with the specific effects of security, irreducible to the absence of 
attachment anxiety and avoidance; social psychological attachment research might ben-
efit from attention to this literature if it proves willing to acknowledge evidence of 
limitations to the two-factor model.
The goals and adjustments of different domains of attachment discourse have contrib-
uted to their respective strengths. More focal awareness of these differences would, we feel, 
help reduce miscommunication and facilitate the coordination of different forms of knowl-
edge: in collaborations between researchers and practitioners; in attempts by researchers to 
influence or draw from clinical and child welfare practice; in work to further articulate 
concepts and refine their scientific operationalisation; in clarifying assumptions when 
speaking to students and general audiences; and in efforts to draw from and integrate 
ideas and findings from developmental and social psychological attachment research.
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